--- id: FAS-PFM-INT-02 title: Provider accounts and credentials acceptance feature: FEAT-PFM-INT-02 product_area: platform module: integrations revision: 2 status: proposed product_intent: proposed source_sha: services-platform: ad3f6a6582843008ed0f5a17b131878d15829af1 macroservice-libraries: 54536a441935c6e09fdb7f96f0bec71c52ba4e03 react-console: baf6dae382d6f41dce976c7f848667ccc37e076f capabilities: - CAP-PFM-INT-004 - CAP-PFM-INT-005 - CAP-PFM-INT-006 scenarios: - id: FAS-PFM-INT-02-01 title: A verified account has safe operational detail kind: behaviour exercises: - CAP-PFM-INT-004 - CAP-PFM-INT-005 - CAP-PFM-INT-006 relies_on: - ATS-PFM-INT-004-01 - ATS-PFM-INT-005-01 - ATS-PFM-INT-006-01 preconditions: An enabled installation supports an entered key. steps: >- Create an account, enter a valid key, complete verification and inspect credential facts and health. expected: The usable account and its health are visible without the key value. negative: false data_needs: 'Run-owned declarations, records and role fixtures in an isolated workspace.' bound_to: [] provenance: proposed source: - >- services-platform:modules/integrations/tests/e2e/integrations.e2e.spec.js#connects a platform account, which starts verifying with its job - >- services-platform:modules/integrations/tests/integration/services/credentials/credential-state.integration.spec.js#answers no secret value, secret name or key version - >- react-console:lib/integrations/connection-dot.test.ts#is grey for suspended and disconnected, whatever the last health check said - id: FAS-PFM-INT-02-02 title: Refresh refusal becomes visible account attention kind: interaction exercises: - CAP-PFM-INT-004 - CAP-PFM-INT-005 - CAP-PFM-INT-006 relies_on: - ATS-PFM-INT-005-10 - ATS-PFM-INT-006-03 preconditions: An active account has a token due for refresh. steps: 'Return authorization refusal during refresh and inspect account detail, attention and notices.' expected: Re-authorization is required and the visible reason follows the saved provider refusal. negative: false data_needs: 'Run-owned declarations, records and role fixtures in an isolated workspace.' bound_to: [] provenance: proposed source: - >- services-platform:modules/integrations/tests/integration/services/credentials/refresh.integration.spec.js#makes one token request when two refreshes of a connection run at once - >- services-platform:modules/integrations/tests/integration/services/connections/connection-jobs.integration.spec.js#degrades an active connection whose provider is unhealthy - id: FAS-PFM-INT-02-03 title: Disconnect retains safe history and schedules secret cleanup kind: lifecycle exercises: - CAP-PFM-INT-004 - CAP-PFM-INT-005 - CAP-PFM-INT-006 relies_on: - ATS-PFM-INT-004-09 - ATS-PFM-INT-005-04 preconditions: A verified account has credentials and no current bindings. steps: >- Disconnect it, inspect its history and credential state, then run maintenance after the recovery period. expected: >- Closure is retained, secret cleanup completes when storage reports deletion and history exposes no secret value. negative: false data_needs: 'Run-owned declarations, records and role fixtures in an isolated workspace.' bound_to: [] provenance: proposed source: - >- services-platform:modules/integrations/tests/integration/services/connections/transition.integration.spec.js#disables the connection’s webhook endpoints - >- services-platform:modules/integrations/tests/integration/services/credentials/credential-lifecycle.integration.spec.js#INT-ACC-0163 step 5: svc_accounting’s payments.authorize right after the replacement, before the re-verification runs, leases the new credential - id: FAS-PFM-INT-02-04 title: Account management does not imply secret authority kind: permission exercises: - CAP-PFM-INT-004 - CAP-PFM-INT-005 - CAP-PFM-INT-006 relies_on: - ATS-PFM-INT-005-02 - ATS-PFM-INT-004-02 preconditions: A reader and account manager without credential permission inspect one account. steps: 'Read account health and credential facts, then attempt key replacement as the manager.' expected: >- Safe inspection succeeds while the unauthorized replacement leaves the account and credential unchanged. negative: true data_needs: 'Run-owned declarations, records and role fixtures in an isolated workspace.' bound_to: [] provenance: proposed source: - >- services-platform:modules/integrations/tests/e2e/credentials.e2e.spec.js#is refused to a caller who manages connections but not their credentials - >- services-platform:modules/integrations/tests/e2e/integrations.e2e.spec.js#refuses a second connection of the tenant whose name derives to a taken id, 409 naming the id - id: FAS-PFM-INT-02-05 title: Correct a refused account credential kind: regression exercises: - CAP-PFM-INT-004 - CAP-PFM-INT-005 - CAP-PFM-INT-006 relies_on: - ATS-PFM-INT-004-05 - ATS-PFM-INT-005-05 - ATS-PFM-INT-006-01 preconditions: An initial key is rejected during verification. steps: 'Inspect the failure, replace it with a valid key and complete verification.' expected: The account recovers to active with features and the expected health indicator. negative: true data_needs: 'Run-owned declarations, records and role fixtures in an isolated workspace.' bound_to: [] provenance: proposed source: - FND-PFM-INT-034 - >- services-platform:modules/integrations/services/credentials/credential-store.ts:verification_retried - >- react-console:lib/integrations/connection-dot.test.ts#is grey for suspended and disconnected, whatever the last health check said evidence: - >- The feature, its capabilities and the detailed scenarios listed in each reliance are examined at the pinned revisions. --- # Provider accounts and credentials: Feature Acceptance Suite ## What the Feature Must Do as a Whole The suite follows account setup, verification and recovery alongside health and credential handling. Acceptance inspects the account a person can operate and the safe detail they can read after each change. ## Interactions Between Capabilities A refresh refusal affects connection eligibility, visible attention and notices. Replacement and disconnection cases inspect those effects together with credential retirement, while the permission case separates account management from authority to replace secrets. The reliance links identify detailed capability scenarios. None of these composed acceptance sequences has a verified executable binding at the pinned revisions; the corresponding coverage finding remains open. ## Regression Record | Revision | Change | Scenarios | Reason | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | Initial | All | Establish the cumulative acceptance sequences and initial regression cases. | | 2 | Testing examination continuation | All | Clarify the feature boundary and preserve proposed status for unbound composed sequences. |