---
id: TST-PFM-SEC-031
title: Invitations console checks
kind: browser-lifecycle
product_area: platform
module: security
revision: 2
status: draft
source_sha:
  react-console: baf6dae382d6f41dce976c7f848667ccc37e076f
repository: react-console
files:
  - e2e/security/invitations.spec.ts
implements:
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-005-05
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-005-13
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-008-07
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-008-08
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-008-11
environment: deployed-dev
implementation_state: implemented
latest_result: not-run
latest_run_at: null
latest_run_ref: null
conformance: not-verified
estimated_minutes: 10
isolation: >-
  Use the suite’s existing disposable identities and workspace fixture boundary; retain shared
  development records.
assertion_evidence:
  - provenance: test
    source: 'react-console:e2e/security/invitations.spec.ts#inviting somebody and their accepting'
  - provenance: test
    source: 'react-console:e2e/security/invitations.spec.ts#invites a new identity from the Users screen'
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      react-console:e2e/security/invitations.spec.ts#lets them set a password and sign in, and
      clears them off the Invited filter
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      react-console:e2e/security/invitations.spec.ts#tells them their account is already set up if
      the spent link is opened again
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      react-console:e2e/security/invitations.spec.ts#re-invites them after their access is removed,
      and the new link works
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      react-console:e2e/security/invitations.spec.ts#resending from the console invalidates the link
      it replaces
  - provenance: test
    source: 'react-console:e2e/security/invitations.spec.ts#revoking from the console withdraws the link'
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      react-console:e2e/security/invitations.spec.ts#refuses to invite an address that already
      belongs to a user, and offers the user instead
dependency_evidence: >-
  The browser drives the development console using the suite’s configured identities and records.
  Service availability, sign-in prerequisites and fixture cleanup remain requirements for a
  successful run.
evidence:
  - 'react-console:e2e/security/invitations.spec.ts'
  - >-
    Static review at the recorded source revision; executable results remain not-run and conformance
    remains not-verified.
binding_note: >-
  Each binding names the scenario to which this file contributes assertions. A binding is not a
  recorded pass and does not extend the file’s dependency boundary.
examiner: codex
examined_at: '2026-10-23'
final_text: OpenAI
---
# Invitations console checks

## Verification Boundary

The file drives the console in the configured development environment. The assertion references identify the source checks for invitations.

## What This Suite Proves

The source assertions support the observations named in the bound scenarios. A scenario spanning multiple files must retain the other files’ contributions.

## What It Does Not Prove

This examination does not run the suite. Passing behavior, deployed conformance and the behavior of substituted dependencies require separate execution evidence.

## Real Dependencies and Test Doubles

The browser drives the development console using the suite’s configured identities and records. Service availability, sign-in prerequisites and fixture cleanup remain requirements for a successful run.

## Must Not Be Doubled

Keep the browser or public request path and the service decisions being claimed real. Any intercepted provider response limits proof at that boundary.