---
id: TST-PFM-SEC-046
title: Access request checks
kind: api-lifecycle
product_area: platform
module: security
revision: 2
status: draft
source_sha:
  services-platform: ad3f6a6582843008ed0f5a17b131878d15829af1
repository: services-platform
files:
  - modules/security/tests/e2e/access.e2e.spec.js
implements:
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-007-10
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-019-02
environment: local
implementation_state: implemented
latest_result: not-run
latest_run_at: null
latest_run_ref: null
conformance: not-verified
estimated_minutes: 5
isolation: Use the prepared test database and suite-owned fixture rows; retain shared seed records.
assertion_evidence:
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/access.e2e.spec.js#security access API (end to
      end)
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/access.e2e.spec.js#the caller's own access
      document
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/access.e2e.spec.js#answers the wall, the grants
      as an administrator wrote them, and the keys allowed in the path’s tenant
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/access.e2e.spec.js#answers a caller whose only
      grant is pending with a document allowing nothing, rather than refusing them
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/access.e2e.spec.js#leaves a member's revoked
      grant out of the document, and allows nothing on the strength of a slice alone
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/access.e2e.spec.js#refuses a tenant outside the
      caller's claim at the front door, and an anonymous caller outright
  - provenance: test
    source: 'services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/access.e2e.spec.js#portal pool discovery'
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/access.e2e.spec.js#answers the pool, client,
      region and domain of a tenant with an active portal, to a caller with no context
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/access.e2e.spec.js#refuses an unknown tenant and
      a tenant with no portal pool with the same sentence, saying nothing about either
dependency_evidence: >-
  The local request harness exercises the route dispatcher and the prepared database. The suite’s
  own dependency setup determines which external collaborators are controlled; registration alone
  does not certify them as live.
evidence:
  - 'services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/access.e2e.spec.js'
  - >-
    Static review at the recorded source revision; executable results remain not-run and conformance
    remains not-verified.
binding_note: >-
  Each binding names the scenario to which this file contributes assertions. A binding is not a
  recorded pass and does not extend the file’s dependency boundary.
examiner: codex
examined_at: '2026-10-23'
final_text: OpenAI
dependency_review:
  provenance: test
  source: 'services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/access.e2e.spec.js'
  explicit_no_doubles: false
  identified_double_boundaries: []
---
# Access request checks

## Verification Boundary

The file exercises public request handling through the local service harness. The assertion references identify the source checks for access.

## What This Suite Proves

The source assertions support the observations named in the bound scenarios. A scenario spanning multiple files must retain the other files’ contributions.

## What It Does Not Prove

This examination does not run the suite. Passing behavior, deployed conformance and the behavior of substituted dependencies require separate execution evidence.

## Real Dependencies and Test Doubles

The local request harness exercises the route dispatcher and the prepared database. The suite’s own dependency setup determines which external collaborators are controlled; registration alone does not certify them as live.

## Must Not Be Doubled

Keep route dispatch, signed-context verification and the exercised service decisions real. A test key can supply signatures, but replacing the authorization decision cannot prove request enforcement.