---
id: TST-PFM-SEC-047
title: Application access enforced request checks
kind: api-lifecycle
product_area: platform
module: security
revision: 2
status: draft
source_sha:
  services-platform: ad3f6a6582843008ed0f5a17b131878d15829af1
repository: services-platform
files:
  - modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js
implements:
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-007-07
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-015-09
environment: local
implementation_state: implemented
latest_result: not-run
latest_run_at: null
latest_run_ref: null
conformance: not-verified
estimated_minutes: 5
isolation: Use the prepared test database and suite-owned fixture rows; retain shared seed records.
assertion_evidence:
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#the
      application access and licence steps as every Platform function now evaluates them
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#the words
      the functions are deployed with (premise)
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#evaluates
      the application access step in enforce, which is what every case below is about
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#evaluates
      the licence step in enforce too
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#a person
      whose assignment DENIES crm.application.access
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#is served
      the CRM route while the access key is allowed, the premise of the refusal
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#is
      refused it once a deny names the access key, though the allow beside it is untouched
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#is still
      served a Platform route, so the person can read their own context and be told why
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#a tenant
      whose licence a withhold override refuses
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#resolves
      a record naming the application in the granted tenant and not in the withheld one (premise)
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#serves
      the application’s route in the tenant the grant is in force in
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#refuses
      the same route in the withheld tenant, under the licence step’s own code
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#serves a
      Platform route in the withheld tenant, because Platform is exempt from the licence step
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#the modes
      the deployed functions are given
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js#leaves
      the process environment as it found it, so no other suite inherits a mode
dependency_evidence: >-
  The local request harness exercises the route dispatcher and the prepared database. The suite
  controls the clock at the declared seams; those collaborators remain outside its live proof.
evidence:
  - 'services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js'
  - >-
    Static review at the recorded source revision; executable results remain not-run and conformance
    remains not-verified.
binding_note: >-
  Each binding names the scenario to which this file contributes assertions. A binding is not a
  recorded pass and does not extend the file’s dependency boundary.
examiner: codex
examined_at: '2026-10-23'
final_text: OpenAI
dependency_review:
  provenance: test
  source: 'services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/application-access-enforced.e2e.spec.js'
  explicit_no_doubles: false
  identified_double_boundaries:
    - the clock
---
# Application access enforced request checks

## Verification Boundary

The file exercises public request handling through the local service harness. The assertion references identify the source checks for application access enforced.

## What This Suite Proves

The source assertions support the observations named in the bound scenarios. A scenario spanning multiple files must retain the other files’ contributions.

## What It Does Not Prove

This examination does not run the suite. Passing behavior, deployed conformance and the behavior of substituted dependencies require separate execution evidence.

## Real Dependencies and Test Doubles

The local request harness exercises the route dispatcher and the prepared database. The suite controls the clock at the declared seams; those collaborators remain outside its live proof.

## Must Not Be Doubled

Keep route dispatch, signed-context verification and the exercised service decisions real. A test key can supply signatures, but replacing the authorization decision cannot prove request enforcement.