---
id: TST-PFM-SEC-049
title: Approved access request checks
kind: api-lifecycle
product_area: platform
module: security
revision: 2
status: draft
source_sha:
  services-platform: ad3f6a6582843008ed0f5a17b131878d15829af1
repository: services-platform
files:
  - modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js
implements:
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-017-01
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-017-02
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-017-06
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-017-11
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-017-13
environment: local
implementation_state: implemented
latest_result: not-run
latest_run_at: null
latest_run_ref: null
conformance: not-verified
estimated_minutes: 5
isolation: Use the prepared test database and suite-owned fixture rows; retain shared seed records.
assertion_evidence:
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js#approved staff access
      over the API (end to end)
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js#refuses a request for
      more days than the maximum, 400
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js#takes the request,
      200, answering it waiting for a decision with the names of what it would reach
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js#grants the staff
      member nothing while the request is waiting
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js#lists the request to
      the staff member who made it
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js#lists it to the
      tenant’s administrator, with who it is for
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js#approves it, 200, for
      the days the administrator chose
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js#is what lets the
      staff member into the tenant, and only then
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js#takes the access away
      again when the administrator revokes it
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js#refuses every console
      route to a user of the tenant’s own customer who holds neither key, 403
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js#refuses every console
      route to Rhythm’s own staff, whatever they hold at platform scope (rule S1)
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js#refuses every new
      system route to a customer’s own caller, 403
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js#answers the monthly
      emergency report to staff, for the month asked
dependency_evidence: >-
  The local request harness exercises the route dispatcher and the prepared database. The suite
  controls the signing key at the declared seams; those collaborators remain outside its live proof.
evidence:
  - 'services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js'
  - >-
    Static review at the recorded source revision; executable results remain not-run and conformance
    remains not-verified.
binding_note: >-
  Each binding names the scenario to which this file contributes assertions. A binding is not a
  recorded pass and does not extend the file’s dependency boundary.
examiner: codex
examined_at: '2026-10-23'
final_text: OpenAI
dependency_review:
  provenance: test
  source: 'services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/approved-access.e2e.spec.js'
  explicit_no_doubles: false
  identified_double_boundaries:
    - the signing key
---
# Approved access request checks

## Verification Boundary

The file exercises public request handling through the local service harness. The assertion references identify the source checks for approved access.

## What This Suite Proves

The source assertions support the observations named in the bound scenarios. A scenario spanning multiple files must retain the other files’ contributions.

## What It Does Not Prove

This examination does not run the suite. Passing behavior, deployed conformance and the behavior of substituted dependencies require separate execution evidence.

## Real Dependencies and Test Doubles

The local request harness exercises the route dispatcher and the prepared database. The suite controls the signing key at the declared seams; those collaborators remain outside its live proof.

## Must Not Be Doubled

Keep route dispatch, signed-context verification and the exercised service decisions real. A test key can supply signatures, but replacing the authorization decision cannot prove request enforcement.