---
id: TST-PFM-SEC-068
title: User names request checks
kind: api-lifecycle
product_area: platform
module: security
revision: 2
status: draft
source_sha:
  services-platform: ad3f6a6582843008ed0f5a17b131878d15829af1
repository: services-platform
files:
  - modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js
implements:
  - ATS-PFM-SEC-007-11
environment: local
implementation_state: implemented
latest_result: not-run
latest_run_at: null
latest_run_ref: null
conformance: not-verified
estimated_minutes: 5
isolation: Use the prepared test database and suite-owned fixture rows; retain shared seed records.
assertion_evidence:
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#the tenant user-names
      route (end to end)
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#a console administrator of
      the tenant's customer
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#names its customer's own
      console users, its portal users of this tenant and of a sibling tenant, and Rhythm's staff
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#leaves out another
      customer's user and an id that names nobody, rather than nulling or refusing them
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#carries the id, the
      display name and the avatar of each person, and nothing else about anybody
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#answers a name for every
      person it names, and the avatar as a string or null
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#answers the body it
      answers and no other property beside the people
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#a member of Rhythm’s staff
      acting in the tenant through a grant
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#is admitted by the grant
      and named the tenant customer's console users, its portal users and Rhythm's staff
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#is named nobody of another
      customer, which its own staff standing does not widen
  - provenance: test
    source: 'services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#a portal caller'
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#is refused by the access
      tier, because the route is console
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#the ids the request may
      ask about
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#refuses a request naming
      more than the hundred people it takes, rather than answering the first of them
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#answers a request naming
      exactly the hundred it takes, which is the premise of the refusal above
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#refuses a malformed id, as
      every other id parameter does
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#refuses a request naming
      nobody at all
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#collapses an id named
      twice into one answer
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#a tenant the caller does
      not reach
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#is refused at the front
      door, never answered about its people
  - provenance: test
    source: >-
      services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js#refuses an anonymous
      caller outright
dependency_evidence: >-
  The local request harness exercises the route dispatcher and the prepared database. The suite
  controls the signing key at the declared seams; those collaborators remain outside its live proof.
evidence:
  - 'services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js'
  - >-
    Static review at the recorded source revision; executable results remain not-run and conformance
    remains not-verified.
binding_note: >-
  Each binding names the scenario to which this file contributes assertions. A binding is not a
  recorded pass and does not extend the file’s dependency boundary.
examiner: codex
examined_at: '2026-10-23'
final_text: OpenAI
dependency_review:
  provenance: test
  source: 'services-platform:modules/security/tests/e2e/user-names.e2e.spec.js'
  explicit_no_doubles: false
  identified_double_boundaries:
    - the signing key
---
# User names request checks

## Verification Boundary

The file exercises public request handling through the local service harness. The assertion references identify the source checks for user names.

## What This Suite Proves

The source assertions support the observations named in the bound scenarios. A scenario spanning multiple files must retain the other files’ contributions.

## What It Does Not Prove

This examination does not run the suite. Passing behavior, deployed conformance and the behavior of substituted dependencies require separate execution evidence.

## Real Dependencies and Test Doubles

The local request harness exercises the route dispatcher and the prepared database. The suite controls the signing key at the declared seams; those collaborators remain outside its live proof.

## Must Not Be Doubled

Keep route dispatch, signed-context verification and the exercised service decisions real. A test key can supply signatures, but replacing the authorization decision cannot prove request enforcement.
