01must proveProposed | The built-in administrator, coordinator, reviewer and reader policies separate comprehensive control, operational writes, assignment-only work and read access, with overrides and confidential access reserved to the administrator tier. no proof recorded yet | permission | api | observed |
02must proveProposed | Reviewers lack general application-reading permission and need additional reader authority for wider oversight. no proof recorded yet | permission | api | test |
03must proveProposed | Protected requests enforce application access, licensing and the applicable record authority and reject absent security context. no proof recorded yet | permission | api | test |
04must proveProposed | Users without Submissions authority do not receive its navigation entry and cannot use protected operations. no proof recorded yet | permission | api, console | observed |
05must proveProposed | Service access filters honor process-scoped grants and hide other processes, while deployed gateway scope enforcement remains a separately reported uncertainty. no proof recorded yet | permission | api, service | observed |
06must proveProposed | Applicants, representatives, contributors and reviewers reach records through their participation, request access or assignment; outsiders receive an absent-record response. no proof recorded yet | permission | service | test |
07must proveProposed | Service reads and database policies isolate workspace records and reject attempts to reach another workspace. no proof recorded yet | permission | api, database | observed |
08must proveProposed | External requirement completion is reserved to a staff-only permission omitted from built-in customer policies and unavailable for customer-role grants. origin: DEF-SUB-0636 (SUBM-M1 run subm1api) no proof recorded yet | permission | api | test |
09Proposed | Staff reviewing uses workspace user identities, while staff application entry requires CRM applicant-lookup rights. | policy | service, console | documented |
10Proposed | Console abilities translate engine permissions into administrator controls, coordinator creation and editing without configuration deletion and reader-only viewing. | permission | console | test |
11Proposed | The inventory describes sixty-second warm-route caching plus another thirty seconds of signed-context validity, without independently establishing the current deployed revocation window. | permission | api | documented |
12must proveProposed | Assignment-read, review-export, application-delete and four layout permissions remain published despite having no route enforcement. no proof recorded yet | permission | api | observed |
13Proposed | Submissions records do not support custom fields, while owning applications retain their own field-bearing domain records. | policy | service | documented |